Freedom to Flourish for Muslim Women: Diversity of Opinions and Rights Discourse

By Online Editor On Apr 11, 2025

Dr Maroof Shah

A Muslim woman has right to financial autonomy, mediated separation and work of her choice as long as it doesn’t violate Shariah norms. What is required from her is support in raising and educating family and thus nurturing good citizens and leaders in all walks of life, making optimal use of her abilities in any field, readiness to work for any community building project, finding rights through well done duties and carrying herself with dignity that calls for dignified attire or modest dressing. These are universals of any great community and civilization building ethic. Much debate has been on women’s rights and denunciation of many women as other on such grounds as veil, work and activism in public spaces and certain roles. Regarding religious restrictions upheld by Islamists often found problematic by Muslim feminists we may make a few remarks that could be adapted as preamble for evolving a basis for consensus on common minimum programme.

Principle of Talfeeq

Talfeeq or choosing between diverse opinions upheld by diverse qualified scholars of law is well known stratagem accepted and applied by major scholars in the Indian subcontinent and elsewhere. As such a Muslim woman is free to choose amongst number of opinions she finds herself at ease with as God is well pleased with diverse opinions for which competent scholars have found evidence in the canon. Apart from classical views, some modern scholars basing their views on fresh reading of the canon considering newer contexts and nature of problems and challenges necessitating creative response from legal scholarship. As such a Muslim woman can choose a public career, don or not don veil. She may even choose not to cover her hair according to some scholars. She has choice of talaq-i tafweez. She can safeguard many key rights through nikah namah. She can go for hajj without muharram in a situation where security issues don’t ordinarily arise. She can secure her maintenance by wisely investing mehr-dower if her parents hadn’t already educated her for eligibility for job or secured her finances through entrepreneurship or silent partnership. Rulings on such issues as care for groom’s parents, personal upkeep issues, making of brows, haircut etc. keep propping up generating much debate and strong judgments from certain sections and guilt in masses who fail to conform to popular juristic views. What is clear is choice between divergent opinions on number of issues that keep dividing traditionally inclined and more liberally oriented Muslim women. Islamic law as interpreted by scholars from classical times onwards allows us range of opinions or prescribes limits within which much diversity is appreciated as a matter of principle. One scholar of history of jurisprudence notes:

Originally, individuals were free to select and follow the school of ijtihad they preferred. They could even combine it with preferred parts of the jurisprudence of other schools. As the State grew more powerful, such choices were increasingly taken out of the hands of individuals. Ultimately, the State took choice away from Muslim citizens altogether in many areas of the law by selecting the jurisprudence of one of the schools as the law of the land.

Many followers of the four most reputable schools allowed transfer (tanaqqul), even for the public, from one madhhab to another, and takhayyur (expert selection) or patching positions (talfeeq) from the different madhâhib; something that is frequently done in contemporary fiqh assemblies by scholars who are otherwise wholly committed to their own madhâhib. (al-Haj, 2019).

Diversity of equally legitimate opinions of diverse schools allows women to choose one they find closer to their conscience or work for more creative opinions of their own based on newer conrexts or factors. Kecia Ali writes:

The Shafi’ school allows a wife to obtain a divorce on grounds of non-support after as little as three days; the Hanafi school never does, even if the wife is indigent and her husband fails to support her for decades. The Maliki school allows a father to contract a marriage for his never-married daughter over her objections even if she is a 35 year old professional; conversely, the Hanbali school says that the father’s power to force a girl into marriage ends when she turns nine. Virtually all Sunni jurists consider a triple repudiation given at once to be legally effective, if reprehensible; Shi’i law, however, counts such a pronouncement as only a single repudiation. These mutually contradictory positions cannot all be equally correct interpretations of an infallible Divine Will. All, however, are significantly shaped by the patriarchal constraints of their times of origin. Once Muslims recognize this, the need for qualified Muslims to create a renewed jurisprudence should be clear (Ali, 2002).

This point complements several other arguments for the idea of talfeeq – choosing amongst several opinions of legal scholars according to demands of reason and conscience or time and space. Much commented hadith – in the disagreement of Ummah is mercy – appropriated by proper application of talfeeq methodology – developed in Ibn Arabi who has elaborated extensively ontology of mercy and defended the idea that choosing easier option is not yielding to lust but to primordial nature or fidelity to divine constitution of man oriented towards expansion of spirit provide ample basis for mercy centric fiqh. We may note that stalwarts scholars such as Thanwi did make use of talfeeq to resolve some important issues including those associated with women’s faith.

Overcoming Legalism and Piety Complex

Some legal opinions currently impacting large number of Muslim women –if not much in practice as they are conveniently ignored by millions of Muslim women but do succeed in causing guilt which has great psycho-spiritual consequences – are here listed.

Presenting papers with face visible though hair would have been strictly covered in conferences or lecturing on Youtube or participating in talk shows on political and women’s rights itself is, from a strictly orthodox viewpoint, forbidden – my face should have been covered and it would have been better if my voice too were under purdah.
Women not choosing to cover hair or exposing them even occasionally or partially in public space – on social media sites or newspapers or television – are liable to be roasted in hell.
Some shaping of brows indulged in by at least 90 percent educated women in urban spaces/offices/brides invites the curse of the Prophet (PBUH) and obviously some action hereafter.
Wearing some make-up in public spaces may well be inviting trouble for oneself for eons in hell.
Women can’t choose number of careers –such as news anchors and administrators – without compromising their feminity.
Women can’t marry without the consent of guardian.
Women can’t cut hair too short to resemble males.
Women better stay away from leadership.
Women can’t keep conditions such as no second Nikah for husband without her consent.
Women can’t travel alone to even sacred places like Mecca.
Women can’t wear attractive abayas or burqas.
Women can’t choose a career outside home without consent of husband.
Women can’t choose journalism as a career that requires from her, on television, read news or anchor programmes, even na’t

The problem is of perceptions, interpretations and very strongly polarized views and somehow consensus seems that women better limit themselves to family and should not come in public spaces – their leadership, their intellect, suspect.

Let me present the problem as summarized by Riffat Hassan, a scholar who has engaged with Muslim theology and constructions of prophet in relation to gender. Riffat laments that “Muslims, in general, consider it a self-evident truth that women are not equal to men.” To illustrate just one example:

Massive efforts have been made by conservative Muslims to keep women segregated by insisting that a chaste Muslim woman ought to stay within the charclavari (four walls) of the home. They have also insisted that a woman’s Muslim identity is determined, largely if not solely, by whether she covers her hair or not. The debate between veiled and unveiled women rages throughout the Muslim. communities of the world and has split Muslim women from Turkey to Indonesia as well as in the Western world into rival camps. Here, it is important to mention that according to the Qur’an confinement to the home was not the norm for chaste Muslim women but, rather, the punishment for unchaste women (Hassan, n.d).

She elaborates the confounding of Westerinzation and Modernization elsewhere.

What is of importance to note here is that an emancipated Muslim woman is seen by many

Muslims as a symbol, not of modernization, but of Westernization. This is so because she appears to be in violation of what traditional societies consider to be a necessary barrier between “private space,” where women belong, and “public space,” which belongs to men. The presence of women in men’s space is considered to be highly dangerous, for, as a popular hadith states, whenever a man and a woman are alone, ash-Shaitan (“the Satan”) is bound to be there. In today’s Muslim world, due to the pressure of political and socioeconomic realities, a significant number of women may be seen in public space. Caretakers of Muslim traditionalism feel gravely threatened by this phenomenon, which they consider to be an onslaught of Westernization under the guise of modernization. They believe that it is necessary to put women back in their “space” (which also designates their “place”) if “the integrity of the Islamic way of life” is to be preserved (Hassan n.d).

Indeed there is a plethora of questions that trouble women anxious to preserve a certain image of authentic believer due to the presence of legalistic mindset that issues opinions on almost everything under the sun and failure to live upto the letter of those opinions creates truckload of guilt or gradual alienation from the wellsprings of faith that is perceived to be disassociated from reality. Let us note a few points that would help sort the issue of living as authentically Muslimah in a world full of compulsions and challenges to faith. The general question of how to respond to host of issues faced by women may be settled by the consideration of the following points. We need to briefly explain the foundational principle that should end every anxiety about anything that contravenes justice and mercy in Islam.

The Principle of Freedom

Indeed, a large part of the Quran’s concern is to free human beings from the chains that bind them—above all, authoritarianism and the blind following of tradition. “Let there be no compulsion in religion,” says the Qur’an (2: 256). God tells the Prophet Muhammad, ‘We made thee not one to watch over [others’] doings, nor art thou set over them to dispose of their affairs” (Surah 6: Al-An’am: 107). The greatest guarantee of personal freedom lies in the Quranic decrees that no one but God can limit human freedom (Surah 42: Ash-Shura: 21) and that “Judgment is Allah’s alone” (12: 40). Our right to freedom includes the freedom to tell the truth, as one sees. Let us not forget that there is no invisible being in heaven commanding and prohibiting. God is Freedom and what one may construe as shackles are summons of freedom; law is, as Iqbal said, ultimately, our own prerogative and one discovers it within. Some most often asked questions regarding permissibility concern issues regarding which the Quran/Sunnah is silent. The legal views invoking solitary narrations akhbar-i ahad that some stipulation may be there and we know there is a difference between legal status of the views based on the Quran and what Farahi school calls Sunnah and those based on solitary reports.

The Principle of Love

The greatest law is that of love and if we are in doubt regarding any ruling or have to choose between two different interpretations we have to decide on the basis of this old principle: That is to be followed which leads to increase of love of God and love of neighbour.

The Principle of Spiritual Flourishing/Eudomonia

The Prophet’s words “By Him in Whose Hand is Muhammad’s life, I have not left anything which may bring you nearer to Paradise and take you farther from Hell unprescribed to you, nor have I left anything which may bring you nearer to Hell and take you away from Paradise unforbidden to you” may be seen as an emblem for this idea. What is forbidden by Islam is in principle forbidden by every tradition and every rational moral creature: “Say, My Lord has forbidden only shameful deeds, be they open or secret, and sin, and unjustified greed, and the association with God of that for which He has sent down no authority, and the saying against God of what you don’t know” (Quran, 7.33).

In Mukhtasar al-Quduri we find key statements on foundations of the Islamic Shari`ah as consisting in:

“Consideration of the welfare of the servants, both in this world

and the Hereafter.

Connection of regulations to their rationales, and persistence

of the regulations in the presence and absence of the

rationales.

Gradual, progressive legislation.
Preclusion of hardship.

5.Establishment of justice”

The five fiqhi schools generally agree that “Islamic laws (1) change with the passage of time and with the change of place or circumstance; (2) must avoid harm”(al-Hibri,1997). Jurists agree that Islamic laws “may be discarded if they are based on a cause (‘lilah) which itself has disappeared,” and “must serve the commonweal” (“public maslaha”) Early jurists viewed disagreements among them as a sign of God’s mercy, because they “injected Islamic laws with the degree of flexibility necessary for a religion which proclaimed itself suitable for all times, all people and all societies. Thus, hundreds of schools of Ijtihad developed, each best suited to its own community and that community’s culture, with its attendant customs and traditions” (al-Hibri, 1997).

Our task is to fight perception of women as unequal implying disadvantaged or marginalized, to question the assumption that her life mission is exhausted by raising a family (this leaves out not only childless women but 80 percent of time from birth to death that a woman has besides duty of child raising for say few years for fulfilling her human potential or diverse creative and other dimensions. Ibn Rushd had long back asserted the need for involving women in diverse careers as child raising is only one of her prerogatives. Most women who choose to stay at home have nothing to do in the age of gadgets and indulge in various evils or gossiping in their idle time. The classical Islamic period has great record of cases of active participation of women in economy and social life. The idea that women are to be segregated off into secret world devoted wholly to easing children in neither justified nor warranted in Islamic tradition. Bukhari has over a dozen chapters on social life of women and we find women contributing in different walks of life throughout Islamic history. Jurists agree that Islamic laws “may be discarded if they are based on a cause (‘lilah) which itself has disappeared,” and “must serve the commonweal” (“public maslaha”). One needs to note Fazlur Rahman’s point that

the process of questioning and changing a tradition in the interests of preserving or restoring its normative quality in the case of its normative elements-can continue indefinitely and that there is no fixed or privileged point at which the predetermining effective history is immune from such questioning and then being consciously confirmed or consciously changed. This is what is required for an adequate hermeneutical method of the Qur’an (Rahman, 1982:11).

Women’s Rights

We may, as illustration, mention a few concrete points that are often raised in FAQs, to show how diverse are choices that women could exercise within the larger limits or range of wide highway of Shariah. Whenever any legal opinion appears constrictive of freedom or not in synch with deeper rhythms of spirit, women can scan diversity of opinions from classical to contemporary times, to choose in the light of all the accumulated experience and wisdom what best leads to their spiritual growth or fulfillment. It is always important to remember that letter killeth and spirit gives life and we worship God who is Freedom. Limiting freedom in the name of blocking the means for less certain or imaginary harm has been compellingly criticized by several scholars including more recently Jasser Auda. Just a quotation will make it clear.

Harm is ‘probable’ some jurists claimed, ‘when a woman travels by herself,’ and ‘when people use legally-correct contracts with hidden tricks as means to usury.’ Again, Malikis and Hanbalis agreed to block these means, while others disagreed because the harm is not ‘certain’ or ‘most probable.’ For example, in the name of blocking the means, women are prohibited from ‘driving cars,’ ‘travelling alone,’ ‘working in radio or television stations,’ ‘serving as representatives,’ and even ‘walking in the middle of the road’(Auda,2008:41).

Mercy-Centrism, Choice and Open endedness

God obligates nothing that isn’t necessary for our true flourishing and disapproves nothing on the pain of hell that isn’t against the laws of moral, intellectual and spiritual flourishing. The true faqīh is defined by the Imam as “he who does not make people despair of the mercy of God, and does not make them lose hope in the gracious spirit of God.” It is in this sense that Ibn Arabi who thought his mission was to declare vastness of mercy of God may be read as true faqih. Jurists who end up sending people to hell for their imagined or real transgressions of this or that manual and who fail to link their formulations or opinions to overarching mercy here and hereafter are not to be trusted. Seek to show or demonstrate in every debatable case where other opinions/interpretations are forthcoming, as far as possible, to any inquirer/critic what Ibn al-Qayyim said:

The Islamic law is all about wisdom and achieving people’s welfare in this life and the afterlife. It is all about justice, mercy, wisdom, and good. Thus, any ruling that replaces justice with injustice, mercy with its opposite, common good with mischief, or wisdom with nonsense, is a ruling that does not belong to the Islamic law, even if it is claimed to be so according to some interpretation (Ibn Qayyim, 1973).

Istihsan, validated by majority of jurists, is “a method of exercising personal opinion (ra-y) in order to avoid any rigidity and unfairness that might result from literal application of law” (Kamali, 2004). A major jurist Al-Sarakhsi considers Istihsan as “a method of seeking facility and ease in legal injunctions” and is in accords with the Quran (2:183). The Sahaaba in their judgments were not blindly literalists and sometimes (as in case of Umar and Aisha, for instance) seemed to have gone much beyond the imagination of even moderate reformists in subscribing to the spirit, keeping in view purpose and transcending the letter.

Given how little is specified in the Canon and how wide open the world of undetermined, we see mercy in operation. One is usually comfortable with the custom and Islam canonizes custom, so to speak. It is no wonder fiqh, especially Hanafi fiqh could adapt to so many continents or cultures and traditionally Muslims hardly felt difficulty in living by it. The Quranic declaration “Take what is given freely, enjoin what is ‘urf (known to be good), and turn away from the ignorant (al-Aʽrâf 7:199)” is readily appreciable as universally applicable liberating praxis for every sane moral person. We are asked to enjoin what is known to be good – this encompasses universal ethic.

From various scholarly works on Usul al Fiqh and Maqasid we may note certain points that further strengthen the case for mercy centrism.

“The majority hold that Ijtihad is liable to error. The minority hold that each of the several verdicts may be regarded as truth on their merit.” (Shawkani, Irshad).
As for the practical rules of Fiqh, most of them are from texts which are speculative in meaning (dhanni dalalah)
Law isn’t absolute and changes with change in context, necessity, circumstances, even person. We know when one’s life is threatened, haram can be taken to the extent that life is saved.
The Prophet discouraged asking questions and companions asked him only 13 questions

We may further note the following points that expand our freedom to choose what impresses our aesthetic or affective or cognitive constitution or navigate amongst diverse options:

Qiyas has been opposed by Zahiri and some other fuqaha implying freedom for us to choose a course of action.
God takes a pragmatic view that we are imperfect creatures.
In the end we are weaned away from taking our agency too literally or seriously. It is grace that finally decides.
For any particular legal stipulation by jurists that one may appear problematic, remember that there have been equally competent jurists taking other views and besides fuqaha se have philosophers and Sufis and poets who have engaged with the problem of law in their own creative ways that offer more refreshing perspectives or alternatives.
For those who use Ijma as an argument for closure of further discussion, it is to be noted that “Any agreement of majority can be a proof but cannot be a binding proof because to be binding, it must fulfill the conditions stated in the Ahadith quoted in support of Ijma (which is nothing short of Ijma of all people, at least all scholars.) There is no good ground to exclude any scholar of any school of Islam, as long as the school or group itself is not considered outside Islam by the Muslims.” We need to note that the Ulama have on the whole maintained that the textual evidence in support of Ijma does not amount to conclusive proof. The verses quoted in support of Ijma (4:59, 4:83; 4:115, etc.) are not conclusive for Ijma. Imam Ghazzali says these verses are indications, not clear Nass on Suyuti’s interpretation is the same. Al Amidi says, “these give rise to probability (Zann), not positive knowledge”. Imam Kashmiri had to read the Quran several times to get some clue in his search for some Quranic basis for Ijma.
Validated by Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali jurists. Istihsan means to deem something preferable and is a method of “exercising personal opinion (ra-y) in order to avoid any rigidity and unfairness that might result from literal application of law. Istihsan as a concept is close to equity in western law.” Despite disagreement by Imam Shafi, Shii and Zahiri Ulama, majority have accepted Istihsan. We need to note, however, that Istihsan in the sense of setting aside an established analogy in favor of an alternative one that serves the ideals of justice and public interest in a better way, as originally considered by Imam Abu Ḥanifah and his main disciples, as Ibn Taymiyyah noted, is “not the form that was denounced by Imam ash-Shâfiʽi and Imam Aḥmad when they encountered some of the later Ḥanafi scholars practicing it. Al-Âmidi (Shâfiʽi jurist) stated that, notwithstanding his explicit denunciation of istiḥsân, Imam al-Shâfiʽi himself resorted to istiḥsân on several occasions.”
Istihsan and Maslaha are also important sources framed for the fiqh of mercy. The discipline of maqasid is also linked to fiqh of mercy. We may focus more on these in comparison to seeking to find a point of Ijma in our contemporary times. It has been noted that once scholars have differed upon an issue there can never be Ijma in the classical sense of agreement of all scholars by future generations since scholarship is eternal. Historically Ijma has been recorded on very few issues that are no longer object of debate and as such Ijma can’t be invoked to stifle contemporary scholarship on new issues that are primarily object of debate between fuqaha or modern critics of medieval

Certain ahadith including the following constitute basis for mercy and ease:

“La darara wa la dirara fil Islam” [no harm shall be inflicted or tolerated in Islam]
The Prophet only chose the easier of two alternatives so long as it did not amount to a sin.
“Allah loves to see that His concessions (rukksah) are observed, just as He loves to see that His strict laws (azaa-im) are observed”.

The above would confirm that no unnecessary rigour is recommended in the enforcement of commands and that the Muslims should avail of the flexibility and concessions of Shariah. As Ghazzali expounded, Maslahah consists of considerations which secure a benefit or prevent a harm.

Another related point complementing the point on ease and open-endedness is attitude of humility advocated in the tradition. Instead of saying what does Islam say we should ask what do Muslim jurists say on this or that point say Caliphate/Islamic State, rights of religious/sexual minorities/women, freedom of belief/disbelief, triple talaq, qurbani, permissibility of music, compatibility of modern banking with Islam, dress code and grooming/hair code. To claim that Islam says this or that about issues that are often debated (we don’t debate invariant value/ethical coordinates), is, generally speaking, problematic. We can only strive to know (to make best approximations) what Islam says/God really means/intends on questions usually asked – on other questions that are more foundational we usually don’t need to ask and do largely know what Islam says as we know what our fitrah demands or what aql-i saleem requires or what conscience allows. And jurists differ in their conclusions on almost all these questions. They don’t differ in matters of worship to significant extent and that explains why none including Muslim modernists/reformists asks for reconstructing them. In transactions (muamalat) they are bound to differ and long back they have agreed to disagree (thus, as has been remarked by a modern scholar, synthesizing two apparently opposite traditionally rehearsed teachings “My community will not agree on error” “Difference of opinion in my ummah is a mercy”). It means Shariah in practice becomes open ended and we can’t close the debate that this or that is the Islamic view of it and hence uncontested. Before one can go for it or for any rigid polemics for and against the host of legal opinions that are hotly debated (our sermons and book shops are stuffed with this polemics on issues that God hardly minds and that require/invite divergent legitimate responses – and one wants to laugh at the anxiety to suppress difference), one needs to consider the following qualifiers or filters that force us to recognize essentially tentative nature of our views and give benefit of doubt to other opinions.

In fact we find the earliest instances dialogue in classical age being close to this ideal – everyone, not just majority, often, agrees on the solution proposed after discussion. Isn’t it sad to note that the issues of democracy, mixing of schools of fiqh, many modern economic and social institutions, travel without muharram relative, women drivers/heads of larger institutions including state, burqa/hijab imposition, views on philosophy and Sufism, supposed innovations in popular piety/devotion, divorce etc. violently divide us to this date?

Fiqh is the attempt to think and concretize Shariah and it differs not just from school to school but even from jurist to jurist. Since God wants to save all souls or make the world livable for everyone who agrees not to destroy it for others, and people differ from region to region, from time to time, from stage to stage of their lives, fiqh adapts accordingly. Fiqh is open ended – we are invited to exert ourselves in choosing their decisions so that God’s intention is fulfilled – there are situations where no fiqh manual comes to our help and we stand naked before God/conscience. It is interesting to find all kinds of opinions within the prescribed limits entertained by Muslim jurists and we find upbringing, politics, theology, considerations of public good etc. impacting on them. Regarding the much debated hudood ordinances in Islamic law, it is noteworthy how Islam’s theory of limits, as framed in Muhammad Sharur (whose reception has been much affected by some of his controversial views and simplistic reductionist view of mysticism) in contemporary times, makes man free to choose from one end of the spectrum to the other without incurring any sin. Applying mathematical notion of limit (to the Quranic notion of hadd) developed by mathematicians of the West, certain old controversies in hudood/inheritance laws get reframed and appear almost resolved. He has argued that “Allah set the limits for the law whose upper and lower boundaries encompass the scope of legislation that human societies are allowed to explore freely.”

Since it is very hard to ascertain the precise meaning/intention of the author of Sharia and one can’t, ordinarily, vouch for one’s interpretation as the final one, one can’t delegitimize other possible interpretations. There is so much freedom to legislate and all we have been given is limits that must not be transgressed. The dialogue must go on while we keep striving for knowing the meaning intended by the Canon.

Liberal vs. Conservative Women Debate

Regarding number of questions that divide more conservative and liberal women – shaping of brows, veil or particular mode of dressing or appearance in public and one may add various questions one can see on various websites or modern fiqh works – the following general remarks may be kept in consideration.

Many fuqaha have clarified that it remains to be determined if routine shaping of brows amounts to cursed mutilation or qualifies the act as nams and it appears in the opinion of many it isn’t to be framed as nams that distinguished women of loose character in that specific context of Arabian culture. Divergence of options amongst equally qualified jurists amounts to room for any opinion that strikes one as more true to one’s lived experience of faith or spirit of it or passes the court of our conscience that has been approved as the Court when one is in doubt. For any question one should first question the anxiety to question. God and His Prophet didn’t like the zeal to ask too many questions and have chosen silence or in principle given approval or ibahi asli to all things generally perceived as wholesome and that don’t harm us. The Quran has given a list of four prohibited items and the prophetic sunnah has added to this list implied few items. Anything that contravenes moral and spiritual health stands disapproved and should be so and this is universal verdict of morally and spiritually alive people. Regarding burqa/hijab and how to appear in public, one may state that God is concerned with safeguarding human dignity. Whatever is compatible with modesty or decency and isn’t flaunting of pathological ego – or is illusory deceitful expression – is what wouldn’t invite God’s/Reality’s displeasure or hell. Against the picture of woman defended in modern neo-Salafi version as encapsulated in Rulings of Council of Religious Legal Opinions (C.R.L.O) listed in appendix to Speaking in God’s Name of Khalid Abu al-Fadl we find version in Ghamidi, Asghar Ali Engineer and Farhad Shafti besides various Muslim feminist scholars including Merenessi, Rifat Hassan, Kecia Ali and Laila Bakhtiar. A few points from the later camp in Farhad Shafti are here presented to show the liberal-conservative divide and it will be followed by some reflections on possibility of bridging or recognizing divergent views and how is it possible to bypass their association with one’s otherworldly prospects. response to CRLO present divergent views of two approaches
Women have been told to abide by a number of rulings for which there is inconclusive evidence on the supposition that we have been directed to avoid the doubtful. Alluding to oft quoted hadith calling for avoiding the doubtful, Farhad argues for need to read it in conjunction with another one from Ibn Majah,
This is because taklif (wujub) only comes with certainty. This certainty is available regarding a handful of issues and thus vast corpus of fiqh
Replying to the query regarding hadith stating thatthe women with head like a camel hump will not enter paradise,” Farhad in his blogs on www.exploringislam.com notes that the hadith invoked here

has nothing to do with any kinds of innocently covering a long hair in any fashion. The hadith is clearly referring to women who have inappropriate behavior. ‘Heads like humps of camel’ is only one of their signs. The problem with these women therefore is not the style of hair, but their evil behaviour.
Second, ‘heads like humps of camel’ can have many meanings, as the scholars have explained. To interpret it to mean covering a long, ponytail like hair, is only an interpretation. The wording itself does not say that.

Farhad draws our attention to Al-Nawawai’s remarks on the hadith recorded in the Muslim in which Abu Salamah said: that “The wives of the Prophet (pbuh) used to cut their hair until it came just below their ears.” “Al-Nawawi quotes from Qadhi Ayyaz that it appears that the wives of the prophet (pbuh) would do this after the death of the prophet (pbuh) to avoid embellishment and to be able to manage their hair better. Al-Nawawi then writes: ‘in this (hadith) is evidence of allowing cutting hair for women and God knows best’ (Sharh al-Nawawi, 4:5).

Farhad is point blank in stating his views against segregation:

I can assure you that there are no strict restrictions on the working of the women outside, mixed with other men. This is a concept that has been developed among Muslims gradually, and only after the demise of the Prophet (pbuh), for various reasons. When you read the history and note how some Muslim women were active outdoors at the time of the Prophet (pbuh) you may agree with me that it seems like some Muslims at our time are more sensitive about gender interaction, compared to our beloved Prophet (pbuh)!

Farhad enters into lengthy and sophisticated engagement with critics and alludes to such instances as Amra bint Nahik al-Asadiyah, a female companion of the Prophet (pbuh) who used to act as an inspector for businesses at the time of the Prophet to question religious sanction of seclusion of women in Islam. Here one recalls extremely vocal critic of seclusion and veil, Nazira Zayn Al-Din (d. 1976), who wrote Al-Sufur wa Al-Ḥijab in which she showed how problematic is the view regarding need of seclusion of women. In similar vein Abd al-Halim Abu Shiqqah (b. 1924) writes in Tahrir al-mar’ah fi ‘asr al-risalah (The Emancipation of Women during the Time of the Prophet):

Through my study of the time of the Prophet I found texts and sayings of the Prophet which show women acting in all kinds of professions in total difference to what we see, understand and interpret today. This great discrepancy explained to me why so many women got away from (Islam) because it simply deprived them of the rights of life; that is why I felt it my duty to free the women from the habits and rules of jahiliyya which are mistakenly thought to be Islamic.

Farhad adds a damning comment: “if the criteria is whether there will be an attraction then basically we need to put the men and women in two different planets.” And gives his verdict on this point:

The Qur’an has never forbade women to be in the public, and only advises them (and men) to be modest in their behaviour. Do you think a woman cannot be attractive to men if she covers her whole body? There are Hadiths suggesting that the Prophet (pbuh) allowed girls singing in his presence. Do you think that could not be attractive for those who wanted to be attracted?

On cutting hair Farhad has this to say:

Cutting hair per se cannot be called forbidden. We would need strong and explicit directive in the Qur’an or the Established Sunnah for such forbiddance and we don’t have any. This is also the view of many traditional scholars of Islam.

The hadiths that appear to prohibit cutting hair are referring to a kind of cutting hair that gives a look that is against the nature of a woman, as created by the Almighty.

I also do not believe that looking like non-Muslim women per se is an issue. Within the limits of modesty, as promoted in the Qur’an, looking similar to a non-Muslim is not forbidden.

There is a hadith in the book of Muslim, that is often used by the scholars who do not consider cutting hair for women to be forbidden:

Abu Salamah said: “The wives of the Prophet (pbuh) used to cut their hair until it came just below their ears.” (Muslim, al-Haydh, 320)

In his commentary on this hadith Al-Nawawi quotes from Qadhi Ayyaz that it appears that the wives of the prophet (pbuh) would do this after the death of the prophet (pbuh) to avoid embellishment and to be able to manage their hair better. Al-Nawawi then writes: “in this (hadith) is evidence of allowing cutting hair for women and God knows best” (Sharh al-Nawawi, 4:5).

Farhad further notes that

It is not changing the way that God has created a certain individual that is wrong, what is wrong is changing the way that God has created human beings. I can assure you that there are no strict restrictions on the working of the women outside, mixed with other men. This is a concept that has been developed among Muslims gradually, and only after the demise of the Prophet (pbuh), for various reasons. When you read the history and note how some Muslim women were active outdoors at the time of the Prophet (pbuh) you may agree with me that it seems like some Muslims at our time are more sensitive about gender interaction, compared to our beloved Prophet (pbuh)!

It is interesting to note the spectrum of opinions within the revivalist camp and internal debate within it on face veil and cutting of hair or public roles or wearing good looking abayas or wearing jeans under a loose long overcoat or brow shaping. Modernists or those classified as liberals seem to simply adopt one end of this spectrum or further open it up. It appears that we have gradually evolved responses that are less sharply defined or less judgmental of the other. It is hard to clench the argument for this or that position and we can agree to keep dialogue open and have the consolation that we shall face God on different terms or according to our divergent opinions of Him. What is clear is certain lack of clarity or intended ambiguity in matters that don’t vitally or obviously affect our prospect for salvation. There is consensus on the following points anyway:

That we shall be judged as per our sincere effort and understanding of God’s will.
That God’s will as expressed in the canon is fraught with complexities and often sustains divergent readings
That hadith corpus itself is open ended in a way and we can’t foreclose the debate on authenticity and contextual considerations or diverse framing of several key traditions that are at the heart of the debate between rival Muslim camps and as such we can’t afford too string views without granting some scope to the other opposite views.

It seems in any case God can’t be interested in contingent cultural issues that get framed differently with religion. What is non-negotiable for a truly serious sincere piety is effort to be loyal to what it is convinced is God’s will or stand at ease in the court of conscience. Guilt is something that has disastrous psychological and spiritual costs and should not be allowed until clear evidence. Mere doubt about certain things isn’t enough to count as evidence of guilt. Let us note, with Shakespeare’s hero, maturity is all. In his book, al-Radd al-Mufhim, Albani who is no feminist, refers to active women at the time of the Prophet and then comments:

These are authentic incidents that firmly prove the state of the women of Salaf (i.e. era of the companions and their followers) in terms of their perfection and magnanimity and good upbringing to the extent that they were capable of doing what they had to do in contribution to good causes. (al-Radd al-Mufhim, 1:155).

It appears that there is evolving a consensus on questioning limiting women to domestic chores and debunking various accusations regarding their capabilities in various domains and higher intellectual and spiritual pursuits. It was Ibn Arabi who recognized and extolled women’s spiritual capabilities like none other. Women can’t be objectified or reduced to this or that role.

One may here refer to other considerations that further question strong judgmental attitudes of certain fuqaha that however continue to be dominant in public imagination. These considerations include

Theorizing the link between sin and salvation or otherworldly consequences, if any, of choosing different opinions. The concept of sin that may affect salvation involves intentionality and knowledge that it is forbidden and if we dispute the second condition by offering another possible interpretation that disputed claim of knowledge while recognizing/respecting the horizons or coordinates of Tradition within which interpretation is offered, salvation can’t be affected on the analogy of error in ijtihad.
All the five main schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali, and Ja’fari), “agree on four basic principles of Islamic law; it changes with time and place, must serve the public interest, should not cause harm, and may be discarded if its cause has faded” (Kharroub, 2015).
A fundamental rule in Islamic law that “A need that is widespread should be treated as a necessity” and Ghazzali’s rule that the higher order necessity should have priority over a lower-order necessity if they generate opposite implications in practical cases.
Differentiation between means and ends and, as Muhammad Ghazzali, that ends or principles don’t expire but means may.
Shatibi’s distinction: “Literal compliance is the default methodology in the area of acts of worship (ibadat), while the consideration of purposes is the default methodology in the area of worldly dealings.”
Mujahidul Islam Qasmi’s emphasis on the need for more open view with regard to talfeeq (picking and choosing, when need is felt, legal opinions from various schools/mujtahids) and Ibn Arabi’s explanation for the same that it is grounded in Islamic ontology of mercy and should not be construed as conceding ground to nafs parasti.
What is considered good by Muslims is good in the eyes of God as well as Ibn Masud. Stating that Isthisan is adopting “what is more conforming to common people after abandoning usual way of qiyas.”
And that “it is the very example of the Prophet and his Companions not to imitate them, literally, in the various areas of ‘transactions’ (muamalat) and rather, to go by the principles and ‘maqasid.’”
Ayatullah Shamsuddin’s suggestion that Muslims need to “open their minds to the possibility of ‘relative’ legislation for specific circumstances, and not to judge narrations with missing contexts as absolute in the dimensions of time, space, situations, and people.”
The point noted in his “Maqasidi al-Shariah: A Beginner’s Guide” by Jasser Auda that in certain/many cases at least

Current applications (or rather, misapplications) of Islamic law are reductionist rather than holistic, literal rather than moral, one-dimensional rather than multidimensional, binary rather than multi-valued, deconstructionist rather than deconstructionist, and causal rather than teleological. There is lack of consideration and functionality of the overall purposes and underlying principles of the Islamic law as a whole. Moreover, exaggerated claims of ‘rational certainty’ (or else, ‘irrationality’) and ‘consensus of the infallible’ (or else, ‘historicity of the scripts’) add to lack of spirituality, intolerance, violent ideologies, suppressed freedoms, and authoritarian regimes (Auda, 2008: 53-54).

Now all these points haven’t been pressed into the service of securing gender justice and dialogue with Muslim feminists or their Islamist and secular feminist critics. We need trilateral dialogue between Ulama/Islamist women, Muslim feminists and secularists on key questions in order to evolve consensus on what to do or how to secure the rights of the vulnerable women. Point scoring against one another wouldn’t do. Women are suffering on various accounts and they need help for which concrete action and joint work is needed. We can’t avoid engaging with religion and religion eschewing secularism and impose certain theological or ideological paradigm. For resolving multiple problems and disempowerment faced by women, all need to come forward and take membership of special groups or communities. These communities would debate and discuss everything that is imposed in the name of certain ideology or theology and evolve common strategies including financial support systems. If all employed or highly educated women contribute daily sadaqah of Rs 10 or 10 percent zakat or 10k soft loan for mobilizing and financing such community strengthening initiatives that take care of women – their debt, their need for seed capital, their food needs, their healthcare exigencies, their legal aid, their counseling for rights and duties especially marriage associated issues – we would soon find new India, new Muslim women whose head is held high and who don’t have to suffer from abuses in home and public spaces.

This article is an excerpt from a chapter in the book “Muslim Women: A Manifesto for Change”. The author can be reached at Marooof123@gmail.com