Dr Sandip Kumar Mishra
Trump 2.0’s seemingly unpredictable and disruptive policies and actions have caused visible anxiety in East Asia among both allies and rivals of the US. Trump has begun implementing a reciprocal tariff plan without any consideration for friends and foes across the globe, which has important implications for the countries of East Asia. Strangely, there are no differences in Trump’s dealings with China and Japan on the issue of tariffs. For instance, on 3 March, Trump reportedly “told the leaders of Japan and China they could not continue to reduce the value of their currencies, as doing so would be unfair to the United States.” Japanese PM Shigeru Ishiba clarified in the Japanese parliament that he had not received any phone calls from Trump about the exchange rate policy. The point is not whether Trump’s claims are true, but the fact that for Trump both China and Japan are the same.
Similarly, Trump claimed that “South Korea’s average tariff is four times higher than the United States” although America has helped the Asian ally militarily and in ‘‘so many other ways.” He also claimed that China’s tariffs are only two times higher, implying that he places South Korea, a close US ally, at a more disadvantageous position than China. South Korea on 4 March explained that its most favoured nation (MFN) trade rates are four times higher than the US but since South Korea and the US have a free trade agreement (FTA), “tariffs imposed for US imports are almost zero.” It is more important to focus on the fact that Trump has been targeting his allies more than his rivals than to focus on whether he is telling the truth.
Trump has also attacked the CHIPS Act 2022, which offers a total of US$52.7 billion in subsidies to companies that establish manufacturing facilities in the US. Many South Korean companies, such as Samsung and SK hynix, and the Taiwanese company TSMC have benefited from these subsidies in the past, but it seems that they will have to face new challenges under the second Trump regime.
Seemingly for Trump, geopolitical and geostrategic considerations are less important than US trade and its economic interests. Thus, Trump appears to be more interested in managing the US trade deficit which is US$74 billion with Taiwan, US$66 billion with South Korea and US$100 billion with Japan. He believes that if the US$295 billion trade deficit with China should be dealt with strictly, the trade deficit with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan should also be dealt with in a similar manner.
Many observers feel that Trump did not mention Japan or South Korea in his inaugural speech for this reason. He has been adamantly demanding that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan increase their defence expenditure, knowing well that that would result in an increased US presence and involvement in the region. In his previous term, Trump had demanded US$5 billion from South Korea to keep American troops in the country; this resulted in tricky administrative complications between the two countries. A repeat of this is a likely possibility.
US relations with Taiwan are also in a state of limbo. The US State Department recently removed the phrase ‘‘we do not support Taiwan independence,’’ which may be a marker of the Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s tough approach towards China. That said, the US hasn’t apparently made any fundamental shifts in its Taiwan policy. Trump has, however, demanded that Taiwan pay the US in exchange for security assurances.
Trump’s remarks on North Korea have also created doubt among US allies in East Asia. In one of his speeches on 21 January, Trump referred to North Korea as a ‘nuclear power’; the same expression was also used by the US Defense Secretary. Whether this is an indication of Trump’s wish for a meeting with Kim Jong-un remains to be seen. Most experts however feel that in his second term, Trump is only going to be interested in “de-escalation, risk reduction and crisis management as the key goals for North Korea policy” and not in North Korea’s denuclearisation.
Overall, it seems that Trump 2.0 will be quite fluid and the countries of East Asia—friends and foes alike—will need to keep a close watch on the US’ moves. Unpredictability and surprise will be the new normal with regard to Trump’s policy in the region. The bedrock of US’ diplomacy in the region has shifted to favour economic considerations rather than geopolitical and geostrategic goals. In such a situation, friends will need to be on their toes as much as foes. This may eventually lead to the search for and building up spheres of autonomy in foreign policy among US allies in East Asia.
Dr. Sandip Kumar Mishra is Professor at the Centre for East Asian Studies in SIS, JNU, and Distinguished Fellow, IPCS.